Links for the day

Interesting reads of the day.

Alabama Can't Find Anyone to Fill Illegal Immigrants' Old Jobs:

The nursery and landscape industry will need as many as 4,000 workers in southern counties early in 2012 to get ready for the growing season, he said, and forestry and farming will require still more laborers. Unable to find legal residents to fill all the employment gaps, [Deputy commissioner with the Alabama Department of Agriculture and Industries Brett] Hall said the Agriculture Department is consulting with the Department of Corrections to determine whether prisoners could do some of the work.

Are wages too low or is there a shortage of skilled workers?  Here is another link, this time from the Huffington Post:

A four-person crew of immigrant workers can pick and box more than 250 crates of tomatoes in a day, Spencer said, or enough for each person on the crew to earn about $150 at the height of the harvest.A 25-person team of citizens recently picked and processed about 200 boxes in a day, he said, earning each member only $24. Spencer said the people weren't in good enough physical condition to work harder or longer hours and typically gave up when faced with acre after acre of tomato plants ready to be picked.

If this holds on more than just an anecdotal level, it appears there is a shortage of willing and skilled labor.   This should put slight upward pressure on wages which should attract more laborers over the long term.   Whether or not native Alabamians  make the shift remains to be seen , it will require a large gain in productivity (determination and fitness in this instance). My guess is that skilled legal field laborers will take advantage of the higher wages and move to the vacated positions before the native Alabamians make the structural shift.  In that sense, I don't foresee this law having much of an impact on the employment rate of legal residents in Alabama.  

The Theory of the Leisure Class

In 1965, leisure was pretty much equally distributed across classes. People of the same age, sex, and family size tended to have about the same amount of leisure, regardless of their socioeconomic status. But since then, two things have happened. First, leisure (like income) has increased dramatically across the board. Second, though everyone's a winner, the biggest winners are at the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder 

Bernanke needed Roosevelt

http://seekingalpha.com/article/23597-the-bond-yield-curve-as-an-economic-crystal-ball

Bill Gross really used to get it and most likely still does, but his recent fund performance has been lackluster to say the least.  But still let's look at what he had to say in 2007.

He finds that short term rates need to be 100 basis points or more below estimated forward GDP growth to be supportive of the economy. Since he sees a 4% GDP growth, he sees 3% short term rates as necessary. A big question mark is whether individuals will “take the bait” and buy homes when short-term rates go down. He does not address whether he expects long rates and mortgages to fall, or whether he simply expects improved economic growth from lower short-term rates to resolve into house buyer confidence to buy at current mortgage rates, which really aren’t very high at around 6%

How did Bernanke do?  Was his fed funds rate 1% below NGDP growth?  

Ouch, maybe we should us a policy tool that doesn’t stop at zero. 

Or perhaps he needed some more Rooseveltain resolve, from his 2002 speech:

A striking example from U.S. history is Franklin Roosevelt's 40 percent devaluation of the dollar against gold in 1933-34, enforced by a program of gold purchases and domestic money creation. The devaluation and the rapid increase in money supply it permitted ended the U.S. deflation remarkably quickly. Indeed, consumer price inflation in the United States, year on year, went from -10.3 percent in 1932 to -5.1 percent in 1933 to 3.4 percent in 1934.¹⁷ The economy grew strongly, and by the way, 1934 was one of the best years of the century for the stock market. If nothing else, the episode illustrates that monetary actions can have powerful effects on the economy, even when the nominal interest rate is at or near zero, as was the case at the time of Roosevelt's devaluation.

What's Wrong with Increasing (NGDP) Expectations?

This notion that we must have 2 percent inflation or the world collapses needs to end.  First let's look how the US fared coming out of the 1980-1982 recession.  Note that NGDP stayed right around 4 percent throughout the recession, until 1982 when the fed opened up the spigot and allowed NGDP growth to expanded to 12%.  As you can see from the graph, inflation expectations remained well anchored throughout the whole expansion process, most likely do to the excess capacity and high unemployment.

Could you imagine how badly people would scream of runaway inflation if NGDP growth was at 12% today?!...  Now let's compare and contrast with 2007-2011. 

10 year inflation expectations as released by the Cleveland Fed last month are 1.42 annualized.  I’m guessing GDP this year and next is right around there.

Speaking Bernankian

It is becoming utterly frustrating to listen to communication from the Federal Reserve.  This one is from Yahoo finance:

Fed considers more clarity on interest rate policy

A panel headed by Vice Chairman Janet Yellen is exploring ways to provide more information on future central bank moves. More clarity on interest rate policy could help reassure investors and businesses that rates will stay low.

Interest rate policy?  Has they simply given up hope in communicating outside of the interest rate channel?  

The Federal Reserve has two massive communication problems right now, the first is there choice instrument in expressing changes in monetary policy is deeply flawed and the second is when they do enact a policy change, there is no direct, explicit target that they wish to accomplish.  

There is hope however, take this quote from the latest Fed minutes:

It was noted that any such accommodation would likely be more effective if it were provided in the context of a future communications initiative, and most of these members agreed that they could support retention of the current policy stance at this meeting. […]

With the Committee in the process of reviewing its monetary policy strategies and communication, and no additional accommodation being provided at this meeting, a few members indicated that they could support the Committee’s decision even though they had not favored recent policy actions.

NGDP was discussed thankfully, but I am not convinced that the FOMC understands anything outside of interest rates, take this quote:

More broadly, a majority of participants agreed that it could be beneficial to formulate and publish a statement that  would elucidate the Committee’s policy approach, and  participants generally expressed interest in providing  additional information to the public about the likely  future path of the target federal funds rate. 

So there we have, once the three fed dissenters leave in January I expect another round of $600 Billion in QE in order to 'push down long term interest rates.'  Instead, Bernanke should switch away from Bernakian and simply say the fed will enact QE until NGDP is growing at 6 percent.

Handcuffed by a Policy Tool with a Zero Lower Bond

I googled 'Fed Minutes' this morning and the first hit was this headline, Futures Flat Ahead of Fed Minutes.  It is such a shame we must scour the Fed Minutes in order to find a hint of direction in our current monetary policy.  Scott Sumner, Nick Rowe and Lars Christensen have several terrific blog posts on the subject the Federal Reserve's communication policy.  They call for a Chuck Norris style central bank, where markets react to the directly communicated 'threats.'  The thinking being that if a central bank is credible and clearly a communicate a policy target, then the markets will do the heavy lifting and facilitate the change in the expected variable (inflation, NGDP, r, etc).  The beauty is that if the fed is credible, they likely won't even have to carry out on their threat, just like any reasonable person would run away if Chuck Norris announced in five minutes he would be back to round house kick you into the upper atmosphere.

I am skeptical about Ben Bernanke's ability to use the the communications channel of monetary policy effectively, not because a Chuck Norris style would not be effective, it would, but because Bernanke's choice of policy instrument tells us little about the expected direction and stance of monetary policy.  It all comes down Bernanke's countenance to use interest rates and the credit channel of monetary policy.  Here is the Nov 2 statement:

"To support a stronger economic recovery and to help ensure that inflation, over time, is at levels consistent with the dual mandate, the Committee decided today to continue its program to extend the average maturity of its holdings of securities as announced in September......The Committee also decided to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and currently anticipates that economic conditions--including low rates of resource utilization and a subdued outlook for inflation over the medium run--are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate at least through mid-2013"

My bold, this is exactly why the markets eagerly await the fed minutes.  This style of communication tells us very little about monetary policy.  In the 1970's the federal funds rate was at record high levels.  Today it sits at all time lows for the foreseeable future, but does anyone make the claim that monetary policy was tighter in 1978 then it is today?  That is exactly why solely focusing on interest rates as a stance for monetary policy is a mistake.

Let's say tomorrow the PIIGS bond yields soar in anticipation of a Eurozone break up.  If Bernanke's only communication mechanism is interest rates, what more can he say that will prevent the collapse of domestic demand from failing as well?  The answer is not much as we have already hit the zero lower bound, his best case scenario is to say we will hold interest rates low indefinitely and try and push the yield curve down lower.  But without alternative measures taken, that will do little to stop the decline GDP as the rush for liquidity passively tightens monetary policy.

It is unlikely however, that Bernanke will allow a deflationary collapse.  Throughout his reign BB has shown little problem using unconventional monetary policy to prevent deflation, but if Bernanke were to choose a more suitable target and clearly communicate his expected monetary policy, these unconventional QE's and twists would not be necessary in the first place.

P.S. I think Bernanke views interest rates as the native tongue for his central banking language and he is worried that if he switches to a foreign language, either he will misspeak or the markets won't understand.  The response to that is as long as you have a clear target and are fully committed to meeting your target, the markets will start speaking your language.